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ABSTRACT 
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic 
in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown Books) and from the 50’s to 
the present by his logical successor John Searle, I have created the following table 
as a heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of 
studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors 
comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure of 
Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of 
Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of reality (LSOR), 
of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology 
of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, 
the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced 
here and in my other very recent writings. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles 
to make complex series of noises (i.e., speech) that by about 100,000 years ago had 
evolved to describe present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive actions with 
basic utterances that can be described as Primary Language Games (PLG’s) 
describing System 1—i.e., the fast unconscious automated System One, true-only 
mental states with a precise time and location). We gradually developed the further 
ability to encompass displacements in space and time to describe memories, 
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attitudes and potential events (the past and future and often counterfactual, 
conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions) with the Secondary 
Language Games (SLG’s) of System Two- slow conscious true or false propositional 
attitudinal thinking, which has no precise time and are abilities and not mental 
states). Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, 
Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference 
Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, capacities, 
hypotheses. Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (W RPP2 p148). “I believe”, “he 
loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in 
spacetime. My first-person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) 
while third person statements about others are true or false (see my review of 
Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts 
and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and 
termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed 
“propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since 
believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not propositions nor 
attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., Consciousness and 
Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer independent mental representations 
(as opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-
C+L p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space while the evolutionarily 
more primitive System One mental states of perceptions memories and reflexive 
actions are always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 and 
System 3--the second and third major advances in vertebrate psychology after 
System 1—the ability to represent events and to think of them as occurring in 
another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination 
supplementing cognition and volition). S1 are potential or unconscious mental 
states (Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 or 
primary LG’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, no tests 
possible, so they can be true-only. Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s 
(SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my 
own case (i.e., how do I know what I believe, think, feel until I act). Dispositions 
also become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted out in other 
ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are not 
Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto, Read, Hacker etc.,). 
Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology, 
contextualism, enactivism, and the two systems framework, and his work a unique 
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investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its 
interaction with System 2. Though few have understood it well (and arguably 
nobody fully to this day) it was further developed by a few -- above all by John 
Searle, who made a simpler version of the table below in his classic book Rationality 
in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary 
psychology developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid 
out in his last work On Certainty (OC) (written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation 
stone of behavior or epistemology and ontology (arguably the same), cognitive 
linguistics or the logical structure of Higher Order Thought (HOT), and in my view 
the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology), and thus 
in the study of behavior. See my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, 
Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016) and 
the recent work of Daniele Moyal-Sharrock. 
 
Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical 
Involuntary Mental States, described in PLG’s, in which the mind automatically fits 
the world (is Causally Self Referential --Searle) --the unquestionable, true-only, 
axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is possible). Emotions evolved 
to make a bridge between desires or intentions and actions. Preferences, Desires, 
and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities--
described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit the world. 
 
Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology 
(philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions as 
SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion or TPI of Searle). W understood this and 
described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the 
mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access to working memory and 
so we use consciously apparent but typically incorrect reasons to explain behavior 
(the Two Selves of current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions are thoughts 
which try to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while 
Volitions are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA- 
Searle) plus acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind 
direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L p145, p190). 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table 
of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over the last 
few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much 
to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by 
current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes which are evidenced in 
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the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 
3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing 
behavior that I find more complete and useful than any other framework I have 
seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three 
dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, 
between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W 
demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly 
different uses (meanings or COS). 
 
In accord with W’s work and Searle’s terminology, I categorize the representations 
of S2 as public Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and in this sense S1 such as 
perceptions do not have COS. In other writings S says they do but as noted in my 
other reviews I think it is then essential to refer to COS1 (private presentations) and 
COS2 (public representations). To repeat this critical distinction, public Conditions 
of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as COS, 
Representations, truth makers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
Likewise, I have changed his ‘Direction of Fit’ to ‘Cause Originates From’ and his 
‘Direction of Causation’ to ‘Causes Changes In’. System 1 is involuntary, reflexive 
or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary 
or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle). 
 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal 
utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). 
Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being 
coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
INTENTIONALITY can be viewed as personality or as the Construction of Social 
Reality (the title of Searle’s well known book) and from many other viewpoints as 
well. 
 
Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the 
Blue and Brown Books) and from the 50’s to the present by his successors Searle, 
Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Baker, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I 
have created the following table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The 
rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the 
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involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual 
processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be 
regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), of behavior (LSB), of 
personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of 
Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology 
of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or 
better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms 
introduced here and in my other very recent writings. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ 
Word 
Cause 
Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes 
Changes In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public 
Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe a 
Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/ No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change 
Intensity 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise 
Duration 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, 
Place(H+N,T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in 
Body 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs 
Language 
Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA**
* 
Action/ 
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/
A 
CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
*               Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
**            Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***          Searle’s Intention In Action 
****        Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****      Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called 
this        causally self- referential. 
*******   Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
********  Here and Now or There and Then 
  
I give detailed explanations of this table in my other writings. 
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I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of 
language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at 
explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is critical 
to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use 
of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination of context variation 
is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous 
tables and charts that should be compared with this one. 
 
 
